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RECENT DECISIONS
crimination in the principal case, the Ohio Supreme Court cited
a Georgia case' in which it was held that there had been no denial
of equal protection. However, the claim of unconstitutionality in
the Georgia case was grounded on the fact that accounts receiv-
able were taxed at a higher ad valorem rate than certain other
types of intangibles. No allegation of discrimination as between
foreign and domestic corporations was made.
The decision in the principal case indicates that the mere possi-
bility of reciprocity between states does not satisfy the equal pro-
tection requirement. The United States Supreme Court will
determine whether, without reference to possible future actions
by other states, the attacked legislation discriminates against non-
residents.2" On the basis of this test there was clearly a denial of
equal protection in the principal case.
ROLAND STRASSI-O FER
19 Parke, Davis & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 296, 36 S.E.2d 773 (1946).
20 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 40 Sup. Ct. 228 (1920).
FELA-1939 AMENDMENT- REPAIR SHOP WORKERS
Claimants worked in defendant's locomotive repair shop.
During repairs, locomotives which had been in interstate trans-
portation customarily remained in the shop, immobilized and
unassigned to future service, for periods of from fifteen to sixty
days. Some of the claimants worked directly on locomotives.
However, one operated a forging machine, making small locomo-
tive parts; and another maintained the shop's electrical equip-
ment. The former was injured while changing dies on his forging
machine; and the latter while working on a switch box. On
appeal from an order of the Appellate Division' sustaining the
action of the Workmen's Compensation Board allowing the
claims, the Court of Appeals reversed, and dismissed the claims.2
The court was of the opinion that all the claimants came within
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act as amended
in 1939' and therefore were not entitled to compensation under
New York law.
Prior to 1939, the FELA provided:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in com-
merce between any of the several States ... shall be liable
I Baird v. New York Central R.R., 86 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 3dDep't 1948).
2 Baird v. New York Central R.R., 86 N.E.2d 567 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1949).
3 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1934), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939),
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1946).
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in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce ....
Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R.' enunciated the strict
test of applicability of the pre-1939 FELA: Was the employe at
the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in
work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it? In
the Shanks case, an employe whose usual job was repairing loco-
motive parts was injured while moving an overhead counter-shaft
through which power was communicated to machinery in the
repair shop, and was held to be outside the application of the
Act. Subsequent cases applying the Shanks test, held outside the
scope of the Act a millwright hurt while sawing timber to be used
in repairing a caboose which had been in interstate commerce that
same day;6 and a repair shop worker injured while rethreading
bolts used in interstate engines.' Repair shop workers working
directly on locomotives which had been withdrawn from service
were generally held not to be employed in interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Act unless the period for which the
engine was withdrawn was very short.'
4 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1934).
5 239 U. S. 556, 558, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 189 (1916).
6Fish v. Rutland R.R., 189 App. Div. 352, 178 N.Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't
1919).
7 Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. Seigel, 153 N.E. 870 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926); accord,
Watson v. Louisville & N.R.R., 242 Ky. 14, 45 S.W.2d 499 (1932) (workman
injured while lifting jack preparatory to raising loaded coal car in order to
repair it, the coal to be used in both interstate and intrastate engines); Phillips
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 287 Pa. 390, 135 Ad. 102 (1926) (employe injured
while remodeling bins used to store spare repair parts used in interstate
machinery). In 1932 the Supreme Court held that an employe oiling a motor
used for hoisting into a chute coal to be taken from there and used by interstate
locomotives, was not engaged in interstate commerce within the Shanks test.
Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 284 U. S. 296, 52
Sup. Ct. 151 (1932). This case overruled Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77,
40 Sup. Ct. 450 (1920), and Erie R.R. v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86, 40 Sup. Ct. 454
(1920). In Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup.
Ct. 592 (1937), it was held that employes employed in similar work were
engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of collective bargaining under the
Railway Labor Act.
8 Industrial Accident Commission of California v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 42 Sup.
Ct. 489 (1922); Klar v. Erie R.R., 118 Ohio St. 612, 162 N.E. 793 (1928);
Koons v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 271 Pa. 468, 114 Ad. 262 (1921). In Oglesby
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 318 Mo. 79, 1 S.W.2d 172 (1927), an employe
hurt while repairing an engine which was used exclusively in interstate com-
merce was held to be within the Act despite the fact that the engine had been
out of service ten days. But cf. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Winters, 242 U. S.
353, 37 Sup. Ct. 170 (1917) (worker not within Act when nothing to show that
engine was permanently devoted to interstate commerce or assigned to it in
[December
1RECENT DECISIONS
In 1939, the Act was amended by the addition of the words:
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties . . .
shall be the furtherance of interstate . . . commerce or
shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect
such commerce . shall . . . be considered as being em-
ployed by such carrier in such commerce
This amendment has been so construed as to include as em-
ployed in interstate commerce employes who ordinarily were
employed in interstate commerce but who at the time of the in-
jury were employed in intrastate operations."° Thus, a repair shop
worker who repaired and rebuilt freight cars, most of which were
used in interstate commerce, was not required to prove that the
car he was working on when injured was in interstate commerce
or set apart for such commerce in order to recover under the
FELA."
The courts in most cases have construed the amendment as
eliminating the strict test of the Shanks case and as greatly broad-
ening the coverage of the Act.' 2 For example, an employe install-
ing a ventilator through the roof of a machine shop in which iron
parts were forged for use in repairing interstate boxcars has been
held to be within the Act." Some courts have expressed the belief
that by virtue of the amendment nearly all railroad employes now
are included within the FELA. 4
advance at time of injury, although engine was withdrawn from service for
only three days). If the engine was immobilized to a sufficient degree, recovery
was usually denied even though the length of time the engine was withdrawn
from service was very short. Day v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 354 Ill. 469, 188
N.E. 540 (1930); Zmuda v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 234 App. Div. 827,
278 N. Y. Supp. 138 (3d Dep't 1935); White v. Lehigh V.R.R., 251 App. Div.
507, 297 N. Y. Supp. 933 (3d Dep't 1937); McGowan v. New York Central
R.R., 265 App. Div. 272, 39 N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dep't 1942), a]fd, 290 N. Y.
289, 50 N.E.2d 295 (1943).
9 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1946).
10 E.g., Maxie v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 356 Mo. 633, 202 S.W.2d 904 (1947);
Scarborough v. Pennsylvania R.R., 154 Pa. Super. 129, 35 A.2d 603 (1944).
Contra: Thomson v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 Ill. 386, 44 N.E.2d 19 (1942).
11 Maxie v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., supra note 10.
12E.g., Harris v. Missouri P.R.R., 158 Kan. 679, 149 P.2d 342 (1944); Wills
v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 205 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); Wheeler
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 205 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); Schmidt
v. New York Central R.R., 12 Ohio Supp. (51' N.E.2d) 112 (C. P. 1943);
Trucco v. Erie R.R., 353 Pa. 320, 45 A.2d 20 (1946); Scarborough v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 154 Pa. Super. 129, 35 A.2d 603 (1944).
13 Wills v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 205 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
14Harris v. Missouri P.R.R., 158 Kan. 679, 149 P.2d 342 (1944); Scarborough
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 154 Pa. Super. 129, 35 A.2d 603 (1944). But see Thomson
v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 Ill. 386, 44 N.E.2d 19 (1942).
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It may be questioned whether Congress intended so vast an
extension of the Act's applicability. The report made by the Sen-
ate committee at the time the amendment was under considera-
tion"5 stated the intent of the amendment to be to bring within
the application of the Act workers who ordinarily were engaged
in interstate commerce but who at the time of injury were engaged
in an intrastate activity. The report did not manifest an intent
to include within the scope of the Act workers whose usual duties
would not have been considered before the amendment as being
in interstate commerce. However, the wording of the amendment
appears to support the view adopted by the courts in most cases
that the coverage of the Act has been expanded to include many
of these. The court in the principal case has adopted this view.
RICHARD G. BELL
Is SEN. REP. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1939).
